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1.1 Low Risk Anomaly
The low risk effect represents one of the most persistent anomalies and unsolved puzzles
in asset pricing research. Early literature by e.g. Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and
Mossin (1966) suggests that investors seeking mean variance efficient portfolios should
in equilibrium produce some form of the security market line captured by the Capital
Asset Pricing Model. Empirical findings however have been quite on the contrary since
the inception of the early models and still remarkably persist today. The security market
line turns out to be empirically flatter than implied by the CAPM with a variety of can-
didate explanations ranging from explanations based on systemic risk1 to pure behavioral
biases2.
The most commonplace explanations stem from two main categories: investors’ leverage
constraints and behavioral biases or hindrances such as the investors’ inclination for
lottery-like payoffs or the asymmetric impact of idiosyncratic volatility. The framework of
leverage constrained investors echoes a risk-based view on the anomaly. In the presence of
binding constraints to leverage, investors are not fully able to take on the level of risk they
desire on their optimal portfolios but are forced to resort to changing the composition of
their holdings rather than taking on debt. The new equilibrium for leverage constrained
investors causes increased price pressure on high risk securities, i.e. stocks with high
betas, and is then materialized by the flattening of the empirical security market line.
Not only does the new equilibrium put pressure on the higher beta assets but also reduces
the demand for assets with low betas, as most investors cannot reach their target returns
by levering up low risk stocks. The simultaneous decrease in the slope and the increase
in the intercept as leverage constraints tighten should then manifest itself as the low
risk anomaly. Recent research, most prominently (Jylhä, 2018) sheds increasing light
on the various forms the security market line takes under changing exogenous margin
constraints.
Behavioral explanations however provide a very contrarian view on the empirical failures
of the model with a spectrum of different takes. Liu et al. (2018) argue that the low risk
anomaly is a product of guilt association to beta and is in fact caused by the negative
return relation of idiosyncratic risk and limits to arbitrage. Alternatively one can take a
1see e.g. (Frazzini & Pedersen, 2014), (Asness, Frazzini, Gormsen, & Pedersen, 2016), (Jylhä, 2018)
and (Boguth & Simutin, 2018) for a recent perspective on risk and leverage constraints based explana-
tions.
2see e.g. (Stambaugh & Yuan, 2017), (Liu, Stambaugh, & Yuan, 2018) and (Bali, Brown, Murray, &
Yi Tang, 2017) for takes on the role of residual volatility and positive skewness.
4positive view on volatility in excess of the systematic risk and tie the anomalous returns
to the chase of lottery payoffs. In fact, Bali et al. (2017) show that the anomaly manifests
itself during times when high beta assets display lottery like features. Nonetheless, one
common denominator for many of the behavioral explanations is their inherent linkage to
volatility, be it idiosyncratic volatility in itself or patterns of positive skewness in returns.
Explanations related to volatility however should not particularly arise in conjunction
with changing leverage constraints.
1.2 Contribution to Existing Research
As persistent the low risk effect has been, the literature has taken quite a while to focus on
exploiting it compared to e.g. momentum by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) or investing
on the Fama and French (1993) factors. Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) present a way of
taking advantage of the anomaly through their Betting Against Beta factor that goes long
in low beta and short in high beta assets. Their approach produces robust alphas on the
most common factor models both in the US and International equities. Consequently the
BAB factor also serves as a useful benchmark for further research in testing and validating
new candidate explanations. Asness et al. (2016) divide the BAB factor further and run
horse races between many of the common candidate variables. They come up with factors
combining in the BAB profit: Betting Against Correlation or BAC and Betting Against
Volatility or BAV. The new factors are built analogously to the BAB factor but are
relatively uncorrelated with each other allowing one to frame the source of BAB alphas
into an alias for behavioral explanations, BAV and the candidate for proxying systematic
risk, BAC.
The competing branches of explanations provide fruitful ground for further research and
bridging the gap. In my approach I provide a novel take on the phenomenon by decom-
posing the anomaly, a stock’s beta into its two components, correlation and volatility.
The alternative decomposition allows one to examine the impact of leverage constraints
in generating the low risk anomaly by distinctively different beta components. To test
the effects, I use daily and monthly stock return data from CRSP between January 1934
and December 1974 in addition to data on changes in the FED initial margin requirement
also used by Jylhä (2018).
To the best of my knowledge, none of the previous research addresses the margin impact
of the return compensation for volatility and correlation as beta determinants. The
approach by Jylhä (2018) serves as an inspiration for much of my approach but stops
short in detailing the shape of the security market line. Frazzini and Pedersen (2014)
also proxy margin constraints in the research by TED spread but end up with findings
inconsistent with their model. Asness et al. (2016) include a measure of margin debt in
5their factor horse races but only report the impact on their rank weighted portfolios that
hardly represent the properties of the full universe of stocks.
I methodologically track the roots to the anomaly from the return relation of the distinc-
tive beta components, correlation and volatility to the shape of their analogous security
market line mockups. Finally, I link the findings across all stocks to the more specific
case of the BAB, BAC and BAV factors.
My thesis holds three main contributions to the existing body of research:
1) I decompose the effects of leverage constraints on risk compensation
I apply the logic introduced by e.g. Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) and Asness et al.
(2016) in attributing the effects of exogenous leverage constraints separately to systematic
and behavioral components. Instead of using the correlation and volatility components
solely for beta- or portfolio construction, I treat them as separate positive return drivers
and construct mockups of the security market line analogously to Jylhä (2018). The
construction of the separate security market line mockups allows for closer examination
of the link between leverage constraints and the systematic as well as behavioral candidate
explanations.
2) I find that conditioned on volatility, the slope of the return compensation to market
correlation is negatively affected by tighter margin constraints
The more granular look on the beta determinants allows for studying the effects of in-
creasing either correlation or volatility while holding the other one constant. I find that
conditioned on volatility, the slope of the return compensation to market correlation is
negatively affected by tighter margin constraints entailing that market correlation reflects
the implicit leverage investors take on in lieu of financial leverage.
My findings are consistent with the ones by Jylhä (2018) to the extent that a similar, albeit
weaker, relation between market correlation and initial margin requirement persists when
controlling for volatility. To amend this view, I also find that (residual) volatility holds
no significant connection to initial margin requirements when conditioned on correlation.
Finally, the use of security market line mockups allows for a more general look at the
phenomenon as opposed to the factor approach by Asness et al. (2016).
3) I provide additional support to returns to a Betting Against Correlation factor being
related to lagged changes in leverage constraints
I find that the Asness et al. (2016) BAC factor returns between 1934 and 1974 are to
a large extent related to lagged changes in the initial margin requirement. However, I
cannot rule out the margin constraint relation in the variance portion of Betting Against
Beta or the BAB factor.
6My results on the BAC factor are consistent with Asness et al. (2016), but also provide a
second view with exogenous leverage constraints imposed by the regulator as opposed to
using broker-dealer margin debt as an endogenous proxy for leverage constraints.
72 Theoretical Motivation and Hypotheses
2.1 Systematic Risk in the Context of the Low Risk Anomaly
The low risk effect is typically attributed to either systematic (e.g. leverage constraints)
or behavioral (e.g. lottery preferences, barriers to arbitrage) explanations. While eco-
nomically intuitive, leverage constraints as the primary driver has had little success in the
existing literature, in ruling out other explanations from the mix. Jylhä (2018) finds that
in a period ranging from 1934 to 1974, exogenous changes in US Federal Reserve’s margin
requirement have an expected effect on the shape of the Security Market Line – that is,
a flatter SML in the times of high margin requirements and a steeper slope in the times
of low margin requirements, much alike its CAPM prediction by Jylhä (2018).
Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) back a similar sentiment by tying their financial inter-
mediary leverage factor to a betting against beta factor and showing that the returns
comove with changing funding conditions. Additionally, Asness et al. (2016) find that
change in total margin debt held by NYSE broker dealers has a statistically significant
effect on the return to their factor mimicking poor returns when betting on systematic
risk. An inverted approach by Boguth and Simutin (2018) provides a similar conclusion.
Assuming that mutual funds are for the most part particularly constrained for leverage,
they show that high beta assets seen as instruments with a high payoff in a leverage
constrained environment, should be priced higher by constrained investors. This then
leads to the same assets delivering weaker consequent returns. Simultaneously mutual
fund managers focusing on low beta assets end up taking on leverage constraint risk but
earning abnormal returns in relation to a standard CAPM.
Mutual fund incentivization in general seems to be another amplifying factor in the re-
turn impact of leverage constraints. As fund managers are typically evaluated against a
fixed benchmark not their risk adjusted performance, the leverage constrained managers
resort to higher beta. Karceski (2002) shows that mutual fund inflows seem to follow dra-
matic market runups and returns are chased cross-sectionally to best performing funds.
The consequential incentive for mutual funds is therefore to shift their holdings towards
higher beta than indicated by e.g. the CAPM equilibrium. On a similar note, Baker,
Bradley, and Wurgler (2011) propose that institutional investors’ mandates prevent the
high-resource, smart investors from correcting prices in the market, but in fact encourage
them to invest in high-beta securities without much leverage. They also suggest that
institutional investors are incentivized by a fixed benchmark causing them to chase high
benchmark adjusted returns, particularly when the market is on the rise. The potential
implicit limitations to access to leverage drives up the demand for high risk or high beta
stocks. The smart money therefore ends up passing on superior return opportunities
8in the low-beta end of the security market line (Baker et al., 2011). Christoffersen and
Simutin (2017) report a similar conclusion among “defined contribution” mutual funds.
They show empirically that benchmarking seems to alter the behavior of leverage con-
strained fund managers and increase the demand of high beta assets in lieu of low beta
alternatives.
Addressing the leverage constraints and the systematic risk based explanation somewhat
disregards the potential behavioral and micro market hindrances at play in generating
the anomaly. Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015) argue that the poor return compensation
of high risk stocks is due to idiosyncratic volatility and primarily driven by impediments
to arbitrage. Additionally, Liu et al. (2018) set their sights on the low risk anomaly and
betting against beta. They find that controlling for idiosyncratic volatility and mispricing
makes the beta anomaly disappear, arguing that rather than being the de facto driver of
the phenomenon, beta suffers from “guilt association” in being positively correlated with
idiosyncratic volatility and therefore negatively correlated with alpha. They conclude
that the anomaly seems to be driven by short-sale frictions and mispricing caused by
idiosyncratic volatility, not by the investors seeking to bet on higher systematic risk per
se. Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011) and Bali et al. (2017) on the other hand suggest
that as market participants select a sub-optimal number of securities in their portfolios1
the poor returns to high beta assets seem to be due to the prospect of lottery-like payoffs
being correlated with market beta.
As Liu et al. (2018) also concede, leverage constraints may co-exist with other behavioral
explanations when considering alternate measures of risk such as market correlation re-
ported by Asness et al. (2016). Indeed, e.g. idiosyncratic risk as a barrier to selling short
should have little to do with changing margin requirements and vice versa. In addition
to Jylhä (2018) reporting the changing shape of the Security Market Line without distin-
guishing between the behavioral explanations, it is relevant to address the theories in the
context of the different beta determinants. The two positive beta drivers in market cor-
relation and volatility may well exhibit different return phenomena without completely
ruling each other out. While I focus on the effect of exogenous leverage constraints, a
similar approach to the behavioral explanations could benefit our understanding of the
beta-return relation and its causes.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
In a leverage constrained CAPM setting a shadow price for margin is added to the
standard equation [e.g. Frazzini and Pedersen (2014); Jylhä (2018)]. The shadow price,
1For additional perspective on investors’ lottery preferences and under-diversification see e.g. Odean
(1999), Blume and Friend (1975), Mitton and Vorkink (2007)]
9measuring the tightness of leverage or funding constraints flattens the security market
line by increasing the intercept and reducing the slope as the margin constraints increase.
I follow the approach by Jylhä (2018), in which the margin requirement m is constant
for all market participants and driven by the explicit changes in market wide margin
requirement. In this case the demand for high beta securities will be higher due to the
investors being forced to take implicit leverage through high beta assets. Simultaneously
the demand for low beta stocks becomes lower translating to higher expected returns
in the low end of the security market line. Following the theory, in the presence of no
margin requirement, implicit or explicit, the security market line becomes its standard
CAPM form. The modified CAPM can be written as follows:
Et(rs − rf ) = ψm+ βs,t[Et(rM − rf )− ψm] (1)
in which m presents the margin constraint and ψ its shadow price.
From the standard decomposition of beta one can derive an alternative definition as corre-
lation with the market return times a volatility term [e.g. Frazzini and Pedersen (2014)].
These two components jointly determine a security’s beta. If the risk-return relation is
assumed strictly positive, elevation in either of the determinants has a positive non-zero
impact on a security’s expected return. Following the logic it should be therefore possi-
ble to construct weaker but economically sound security market line mockups in which
the expected return would be positively related to either one of these two components.
Alternative beta definition can then be written as:
βˆtst = ρˆ
σˆs
σˆm
(2)
in which ρˆ is the correlation between the stock and the market and σˆs and σˆm are the
respective volatilities
The alternative decomposition also allows one to address the different ways to arrive at a
similar beta. The seemingly same risk measure can be achieved through higher or lower
correlation given a different level in security volatility in relation to the market and vice
versa. This is also important in dissolving the beta anomaly; i.e. if the weak return to
high beta assets is truly driven by increased allocation to systematic risk to cope with
leverage constraints. On the other hand this allows one to examine whether investors
truly increase their allocation to beta in its traditional sense as a measure of systematic
risk or if additional returns are sought through primarily by increasing allocation to level
10
of volatility in relation to the market.
If overallocation to systematic risk as proposed by Asness et al. (2016) is proxied by the
correlation component in my beta decomposition and driven by leverage constraints, it
should hold that increase in market correlation has a negative impact on risk-adjusted
returns. High correlation portfolios should therefore exhibit lower alphas on standard
factor models compared to low correlation portfolios. As argued by Asness et al. (2016),
correlation should be the term of interest for institutional investors in this alternative
beta decomposition as it represents a “pure bet on systematic risk”. Consequently in the
presence of binding margin constraints sophisticated and somewhat diversified investors
should over allocate their funds in stocks with high correlation with the market. Explicit
market-wide increase in margin constraints therefore reduces the slope and increases the
intercept in a model in which returns are driven by correlation with the market.
As beta is jointly determined by both the correlation and volatility terms, it may be
difficult to determine the impact of margin constraints on each of these terms. Following
the logic of the Betting Against Correlation factor introduced by Asness et al. (2016),
when normalized for volatility, increase in leverage constraints should lead to a weaker
return to market correlation. The impact should materialize from implicitly increasing
beta without making the stocks more attractive to volatility related or behavioral ex-
planations such as lottery preferences, idiosyncratic volatility or short-sale impediments.
Similarly, when controlling for correlation with the market, the margin impact on high
volatility stocks should not be significant if one is to assume that the volatility term is
largely related to behavioral explanations. If this were the case contrary to the factor
model view of asset pricing, it would seem that investors also resort to high volatility
stocks as a way to cope with binding leverage constraints, painting a picture of far less
sophisticated investors than proposed by the CAPM.
One important implication of the chosen time period for this study is the significantly
lower institutional stock ownership than is experienced today. As also noted by Jylhä
(2018), households held an average of 84.7 % of all US corporate equities compared to
37.3 % in 2018 and institutional investors only averaged 12.8 % compared to 46.7 %
in 2015. In addition to making the regulatory margin requirement a relevant leverage
constraint in the Jylhä (2018) paper, the low institutional ownership of stocks is likely to
have an impact on the relevant measure of risk.
Levy (1978) proposes an amended version of the CAPM to take into account the varying
maximum number of stocks held by individual investors. Based on the empirically low
numbers of individual stocks held by investors the model implies that a true measure for
systematic risk can be derived from the average constrained investor’s systematic risk
rather than the CAPM beta for each security. Levy (1978) argues that at least part
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of the investors can only hold a suboptimal portfolio with the number of stocks lower
than the mean variance efficient portfolio, but optimize their portfolio with respect to
the number of stocks they can include. This leads to lower observed beta coefficients
than implied by the CAPM and the individual stock variance playing a much more
prevalent role in determining expected returns. Merton (1987) backs this sentiment when
defining an equilibrium model in when the investors possess incomplete information in
the market; informed investors form mean variance efficient portfolios only within the
stocks of which they have information yet again resulting in suboptimal portfolios from
the CAPM perspective.
Against this backdrop, one can intuitively expect two things in noting the selected time
period. Firstly, as the number of household investors in the sample is clearly higher than
at the time of this study, the average number of securities that investors have information
on and therefore have invested in is likely to be significantly lower than today driven by
both the number of resourceful investors and the cost of acquiring sufficient information.
Secondly, given the lower number of stocks held in individual portfolios, the role of residual
risk over the CAPM implied systematic portion should be higher than today. The weight
of systematic risk as a primary driver for expected return is less and less important as the
number of stocks held decreases strengthening the role of residual stock-specific variance.
Going back to the impact of leverage constraints one would therefore expect that when
faced with leverage constraints, the investors with the least shares would be more inclined
to pursue higher returns from the volatility component of beta instead of pure systematic
risk.
2.3 Hypothesis Formulation
In coping with leverage constraints, leverage constrained investors are forced to take on
implicit leverage in the form of increasing beta [e.g. Christoffersen and Simutin (2017),
Boguth and Simutin (2018)]. My first and second propositions have to do with this
implicit leverage in relation to the my beta decomposition. Similarly to Asness et al.
(2016) I treat my correlation measure as a proxy for a pure measure of systematic risk
as it should be fairly unrelated to behavioral factors when conditioned on the volatility
term. On the other hand, the volatility term should be separate from the systematic risk
aspect, when conditioned on the correlation with the market.
Proposition 1: A security’s correlation with the market mirrors the implicit leverage that
the security offers to a diversified investor and is therefore priced higher than implied by
the CAPM.
Most households and typical mutual funds are constrained for leverage. Treating dispro-
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portionate funds allocation to higher beta assets as binding leverage constraints and a
way to substitute for taking leverage is consistent with the existing research involving
leverage constrained fund managers [e.g. Baker et al. (2011), Christoffersen and Simutin
(2017) and Karceski (2002)]. Further, as a security’s correlation with the market reflects
a stock’s exposure to systematic risk volatility held constant, it should hold that compen-
sation for tight leverage constraints would be sought from assets with higher correlation
with the market. Assuming investors still seek to construct mean-variance efficient port-
folios conditioned on their limitations to take on leverage, pure volatility should not play
much of a role. The volatility and correlation components should by definition be rela-
tively uncorrelated. By substituting beta decomposition in the constrained model one can
divide the expected return into parts related to systematic and behavioral explanations.
The correlation component acts similarly to applied leverage when comparing two assets
with similar volatility based risk profiles.
Constrained SML following Jylhä (2018) with the alternative beta decomposition can be
formulated as follows:
Et(rs − rf ) = ψm+ ρˆt
σˆs,t
ˆσm,t
[Et(rM − rf )− ψm] (3)
in which ρˆt is the correlation between the stock and the market, σˆs,t is the volatility of
stock s and ˆσm,t is the volatility of the market.
Holding volatility constant the slope of the correlation – return relation should be lowered
by higher margin constraints. This is intuitive since in my beta definition the correlation
component merely describes the exposure of stock level volatility to market movements.
This being the case, correlation with the market should be almost equally available for
all levels of volatility and therefore allow investors to pick stocks with similar volatility
but higher risk measured by beta – much like applying explicit leverage. In a world of
changing explicit leverage constraints, the possibility of investing in such stocks should
be more valuable during times of high margin requirement and therefore reflected in the
shadow price for margin constraints.
Proposition 2.1: Exogeneous margin constraints flatten the return compensation for taking
on higher correlation with the market.
Proposition 2.2: Exogeneous margin constraints flatten the return compensation for taking
on higher correlation with the market, given a set level of volatility
My second proposition is two-fold: following my first hypothesis as investors seek assets
with higher expected return from systematic risk in reacting to tightening leverage con-
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straints the impact should materialize through correlation with the market, i.e. bets on
the systematic risk. Simultaneously I recognize the potential implications of the major
shift in stock ownership from almost fully household-owned to majority being managed
by institutional investors and foreign participants. Given a fixed return benchmark, the
CAPM and the contribution by e.g. Asness et al. (2016) imply that solely systematic risk
should be sought after in optimally balancing out the leverage constraints. This however
does not seem to hold water in a world with mean variance portfolios being constructed
from a very small subset of assets. Boehme, Danielsen, Kumar, and Sorescu (2009) fur-
ther support the theories of under-diversification in finding that higher contemporaneous
idiosyncratic volatility indeed generates statistically significant positive alphas indicating
the more important role of residual variance proposed by e.g. Merton (1987).
Proposition 3.1: Leverage constraints drive BAB factor returns primarily through the
BAC factor, i.e. due to investors seeking systematic risk from market correlation.
Proposition 3.2: Market-wide changes in margin requirements do not increase demand
for behavioral, volatility related explanations to the beta anomaly.
My third proposition is a derivation of the two first ones, leaning on the central hypothesis
by Asness et al. (2016): volatility held constant, correlation with the market represents
a bet on systematic risk without the behavioral explanations linked to volatility. This
formulation also continues on the intuition presented by e.g. Frazzini and Pedersen
(2014) and Jylhä (2018) as it states that investors’ leverage constraints increase the
price pressure on high beta assets, but primarily the ones for which higher beta comes
from higher correlation with the market rather than the level of stock specific volatility
in relation to the market, a factor that can largely be mitigated in a well diversified
portfolio. From this trail of thought it then follows that if investors in fact cope with the
changing margin requirements by seeking more systematic risk through correlation with
the market, the returns to the BAC factor should reflect such behavior just as Asness
et al. (2016) argue. On the other hand, the BAV factor should have little to do with
this systematic, portfolio risk driven behavior. In the presence of market wide leverage
constraints, my first two propositions state that the shape of the volatility-return relation
should not be dependent on changing margin requirements. Therefore, to confirm the
lack of this link, I also hypothesize that returns to the BAV factor as a pure volatility
driven construct, should not be dependent on the prevalent leverage constraints.
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3 Data and Summary Statistics
As I focus on the impacts of FED’s explicit margin changes between 1934 and 1974,
the scope of my test dataset is limited to the same interval. I use the dataset on margin
changes as provided by Jylhä (2018), including 22 explicit changes in the level of minimum
margin requirement for positions in listed US equities between October 1, 1934 and
January 3, 1974. The level of initial margin requirement ranges from 40 % in November
1937 to 100% January 1946 with significant variation within the period.
I obtain daily and monthly stock returns between January 1, 1931 and December 31,
1974 from CRSP to compute running stock volatilities and correlations between the each
security and the market. Following Jylhä (2018), I only use stocks with share codes 10
and 11, listed in NYSE. AMEX and NASDAQ are established during the data period and
may therefore cause distortion in the results. I exclude all stocks with daily or monthly
returns of more than 100 % or less than -100 %. My clean dataset includes 489 thousand
monthly and 11.2 million daily observations. For market excess return, I use CRSP
value-weighted market index less a risk-free rate from Kenneth French’s website.
Table 1 reports the main characteristics of my monthly data set. The total monthly stock
data set for which one can compute relevant correlation and volatility measures covers
297 thousand total observations. Notably, the average beta in the data is around 1.15
with a standard deviation of 0.53. Taking a closer look at the determinants in correlation
and volatility, it is evident that volatility exhibits far greater maximum deviations from
the mean, but is still on par in terms of standard deviation.
Table 1: Monthly Descriptive Statistics
This table reports summary statistics on the monthly return data along with the correlation
term with the market (ρˆ) and the volatility term used in beta construction ( σˆs
σˆm
). Returns are
in monthly percentages. Market capitalization is reported in $ Billion. For comparability with
Jylhä (2018) Beta is computed by regressing monthly excess returns on the market return less
the risk free rate from month t− 36 to month t− 1.
Statistic N Mean Pctl(25) Pctl(75) St. Dev. Min Max
Return 296,808 0.012 −0.038 0.056 0.086 −0.565 0.970
Market Cap 296,808 0.340 0.027 0.241 1.404 0.001 50.592
Beta 296,808 1.152 0.785 1.467 0.526 −1.488 4.821
Market Correlation 296,808 0.264 0.189 0.342 0.107 −0.252 0.609
Volatility Term 296,808 3.051 2.105 3.687 1.351 0.265 15.751
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4 Empirical Methodology
In this section I discuss the empirical approach and the key methods I use to test my
hypotheses. First I briefly gloss over the key estimates I use to further study the impact
of margin constraints including estimating correlation, volatility and beta. Second I
run through my methodology for testing the overall impact margin constraints have on
the security market line and analogously constructed security line mockups based on
volatility and correlation. Thirdly, I elaborate on my methodology in isolating the effect
of the initial margin requirement within portfolios constructed by sorting on correlation
and volatility. Finally, I present the construction of BAB, BAC, and BAV factors in my
setting and their connection to the preceding tests.
4.1 Correlation, Volatility and Beta
I use daily return data to estimate the volatility and correlation terms. For volatilities I
apply a a one-year rolling window and use a longer three-year window for correlations.
Similarly, I use overlapping three day returns to estimate correlation and one day log
returns for volatilities. I run the volatility estimation through rolling periods of 250
trading days and use 750 trading days for correlation to account for slower movement. In
constructing the correlation and volatility terms I only include companies for which the
data covers at least one rolling period at a daily frequency. To build my first beta estimate
I utilize the correlation and volatility terms as discussed earlier and following Vasicek
(1973) I also apply time series shrinkage towards the cross-sectional mean ˆβXSt .
βˆt = wi
ˆβTSt + (1− wi)
ˆβXSt (4)
In which, following Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), I apply constant values of wi = 0.6 and
ˆβXSt = 1, across all stocks to maintain comparability
To distinguish between the effects of the correlation and volatility terms, each month
t, I sort all stocks independently into five quantiles on my correlation and volatility
measures based on the values in the end of month t − 1. The summary statistics for
the sorted portfolios are presented in table 2. Within the highest and lowest correlation
portfolios the mean correlation with market return varies between 0.17 and 0.37 with
the with the minimum and maximum being -0.12 and 0.52 respectively. For volatility
the relative variation is far greater with mean values ranging from 1.76 to 4.25 when
scaled for market volatility. As is expected, the independently estimated beta increases
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monotonically in going up the portfolios constructed by both correlation and volatility.
Notably, the higher the correlation portfolio, the lower the mean volatility term resulting
a 11 % volatility difference between the high and low correlation portfolios. This is also
evident in the negative Pearson correlation between the correlation and volatility terms of
-0.07 in monthly data. However this relationship is not quite as evident when looking at
the portfolios constructed by sorting on volatility as the mean market correlation remains
rather close in all quantiles.
The standard deviation in betas, between quantiles, seems to be quite strongly driven by
variation in the volatility term. In table 2 Panel A, the standard deviation of the monthly
beta estimates is driven by the increasing volatility term as correlation decreases. The
same effect is visible in panel B, in which standard deviation in betas doubles going from
the lowest volatility portfolio to the highest.
Table 2: Summary Statistics on Portfolios Sorted on Correlation and Volatility
This table presents the summary statistics on portfolios sorted independently on correlation with
the market and volatility in relation to market volatility between 1934 and 1974. Correlation
is computed over a 750 trading day rolling window using overlapping three-day log returns.
Volatility is estimated from a rolling window of 250 daily log returns for both each stock and the
market. I compute the portfolio beta independently be regressing each stock’s monthly excess
returns from t− 36 to t− 1 over the corresponding market excess returns proxied by the CRSP
value weighted index less the risk free rate.
Panel A: Sort on Correlation
Cor PF Mean Cor Max Cor Min Cor Mean Vola Mean Beta SD Beta
1 0.17 0.31 -0.12 2.94 0.80 0.53
2 0.24 0.37 0.13 2.87 1.02 0.50
3 0.28 0.40 0.17 2.86 1.16 0.49
4 0.31 0.44 0.20 2.81 1.25 0.46
5 0.37 0.52 0.23 2.62 1.31 0.42
Panel B: Sort on Volatility
Vola PF Mean Vola Max Vola Min Vola Mean Cor Mean Beta SD Beta
1 1.76 4.24 0.26 0.28 0.75 0.32
2 2.26 4.88 0.97 0.28 0.93 0.36
3 2.66 6.10 1.20 0.27 1.07 0.40
4 3.17 7.40 1.38 0.27 1.25 0.45
5 4.25 30.88 1.55 0.27 1.56 0.59
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4.2 Margin Level Impact on Returns to Correlation and Volatil-
ity
In order to estimate the potential effects of changing margin regulation on the return
compensation I follow the approach by Jylhä (2018) and adapt the methodology to my
more granular setting. In addition to estimating the security market lines for each month,
I construct two distinct security market line mockups based on the two beta components:
correlation with the market and volatility. I then study the impact of changing margin
requirements on the return compensation of each of the terms individually.
The methodology for betas, correlation and volatility consists of three stages. First, each
month I sort the stocks into portfolios based on betas, correlation and volatility (depend-
ing on which I treat as the return driver in each model) to create maximum measure
spread in the test assets. In the second stage I regress the cross-sectional returns on
the portfolio betas, correlations and volatilities, again depending on the sorting variable.
This results in a time series of security market line intercepts and slopes for beta, and
“security market line mockups”. Finally, I regress the security market line (or mockup)
intercept and slope on the prevailing margin requirement to study the final effect of the
exogeneous margin requirements.
To distinguish between different levels in the variable in question, each month I sort the
stocks into 20 equally sized portfolios based on the variable level (beta, correlation or
volatility). For each of the portfolios I estimate the monthly variable values: I regress
monthly portfolio returns in excess of the risk free rate on the market excess return from
month t-36 to month t-1 to following Jylhä (2018) to obtain portfolio level betas. I
estimate correlation with the market similarly to individual stock level returns, i.e. using
a 750 day rolling window and three-day log returns. Similarly, the volatility estimate
comes from a 250 day rolling window of daily returns. I then obtain the security market
line (or mockup) estimates each month by regressing the portfolio excess returns on
the ex-ante betas (or mockup drivers) from the second stage. These regressions yield
estimates for the SML intercept and slope for each month. The SML (mockups) from
the second stage takes the form:
repf,t = interceptt + slopet ˆγpf,t−1 + et (5)
in which ˆγpf,t−1 stands for the each of the one-month lagged variables of interest in each
of the models, i.e. beta, market correlation and volatility.
Lastly, having obtained the estimates for intercept and slope from the second stage, I
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study the impact the initial margin requirements have on the shape of my SML and
SML mockups. I follow the methodology by Jylhä (2018) in regressing the intercept
and slope coefficients from the second stage on the lagged initial margin requirement as
well as additional controls including e.g. contemporaneous market return. Similarly to
Jylhä’s setting, the coefficient b1 should be positive and coefficient b2 should be negative
if margin constraints drive up the cross-sectional price for additional risk. The third stage
regressions yield the margin level impact on the previously estimated intercept and slope.
margint−1 stands for the one-month lagged initial margin requirement and Xt presents
a vector of the additional control variables in the setting.
interceptt = a1 + b1margint−1 + c1Xt + u1,t (6)
slopet = a2 + b2margint−1 + c2Xt + u2,t (7)
4.3 Initial Margin Requirement and Portfolios Sorted on Volatil-
ity and Correlation
In order to further analyze how the impact of margin constraints materializes with respect
to correlation with the market and volatility I run similar analogous security market line
mockups for both correlation and volatility but aim to eliminate the effects of the other
contemporaneous determinant of beta. To achieve this distinction, in the beginning of
each month I sort the stocks in five equal size portfolios on one-month lagged correla-
tion and volatility. Table 2 reports the summary statistics on the independently sorted
portfolios. Then, within each portfolio, I perform the three-stage process similarly to the
methodology applied to the full sample. This is to minimize the undesired spread in the
other determining variable, i.e. to limit the impact of volatility on beta when studying
the effects of correlation with the market. Additionally, this is also to maintain some
comparability to the BAC and BAV factors introduced by Asness et al. (2016), albeit
without dimension arising from rank-weighing within the different quantiles.
4.4 BAB, BAC and BAV
I decompose the BAB-factor following Asness et al. (2016) by creating two portfolios,
BAC and BAV. BAC goes long (short) in stocks with low (high) correlation with the
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market return, while matching the volatility of its constituents. BAV goes long (short) in
stocks with low (high) estimated volatility and similarly tries to match the correlations
between the long- and short legs. These factors then represent the two determinants of
the BAB factor, while excluding the effect of each other.
More specifically, I construct the BAC factor by first sorting the stocks into five quantiles
based on their volatility estimate in the previous month. In each of the volatility quantiles
I rank the stocks based on their correlation with the market, and place them in two
portfolios: high- and low market correlation. The stocks are then assigned weights based
on their rank – stocks with highest correlation stocks receiving the most weight in the
high correlation portfolio and low correlation stocks receiving the most weight in the
low portfolio. Further, the portfolios are re-balanced by in the beginning of each month
and levered to have a beta of one during formation. The BAC factor is then the equal-
weighted average of the five portfolios. I apply the same methodology form the BAV
factor, but reverse the roles (first sort stocks by correlation, then rank by estimate of
volatility). Portfolio weights are then given by:
w
Q
H = k
q(zq − z−q)+ (8)
w
Q
L = k
q(zq − z−q)− (9)
in which zq is an n(q) ∗ 1 vector of correlation ranks within each volatility quantile.
The two factors aim to explain the returns to a BAB factor from two distinctive directions,
systematic risk and volatility. Figure 1 reports the cumulative returns to each of the
factors during the period. Notably, until the end of 1950’s, the BAB factor performance
is very much hand-in-hand with the BAV factor return with little to no cumulative gains.
From this moment onwards the balance between the determinants changes visibly as
the BAB factor catches up with BAC during the 1960’s and early 1970’s. Figure 1 also
illustrates the relation between these three factors: changes in BAB return are determined
by both the correlation and variance parts with changing weight across time. I also verify
this relation by regressing the BAB factor return on both of its analogous determinants,
BAV and BAC and present the results in table 3. The BAB factor generates a statistically
insignificant intercept of 4 bps and loads heavily on both the BAC and BAV factors as is
expected with an adjusted R2 of 0.78. Also, as we just observed from figure 1, the BAV
factor seems to be the more dominant determinant of the BAB returns in the period.
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Motivated by this decomposition it seems then relevant to study the potential impacts
of margin constraints on both of these factors.
Figure 1: Cumulative Returns in the Period from BAB, BAC and BAV
Table 3: BAB Factor Regressed on BAC and BAV
This table reports the BAB factor as a linear combination of a Betting Against Variance (BAV)
and Betting Against Correlation (BAC) factors. I construct BAC and BAV following the logic
presented by Asness et al. (2016). The factors are rank-weighed with e.g. in the case of BAC,
the factor going long in low and short in high correlation assets, the highest beta receive sthe
highest rank in the short leg and vice versa for lowest correlation in the long portfolio. Monthly
alphas are in relation to total price (percentage / 100). T-statistics for each of the coefficients
are in parentheses
Dependent variable:
BAB Factor Return
Constant 0.0004
(0.546)
BAV 0.829
(37.898)∗∗∗
BAC 0.562
(15.219)∗∗∗
Observations 456
R2 0.777
Adjusted R2 0.776
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
21
5 Findings
This section presents the empirical findings from the tests introduced in the previous
section. In addition to the quantitative outcomes I discuss the theoretical and practical
implications of my findings as well as how they tie into my initial hypotheses. Addi-
tionally I include the potential limitations for my approach. First, I address the overall
performance of the beta coefficient, correlation and volatility as return drivers in the
cross-section as well as their relevance and scalability given the time period. Secondly,
I discuss the overall impact of the margin requirement on beta, correlation and volatil-
ity. Thirdly, I expand the analysis by eliminating the effects of volatility and correlation
on each other by performing the same tests within sub-samples sorted on each of the
variables. Finally, I examine the performance of the BAB, BAC and BAV factors in the
context of how the margin constraints impact seems to materialize.
5.1 Return Compensation by Beta Component
Table 4 reports the Fama and French (1993) three-factor alphas on portfolios sorted on
correlation with the market and volatility. The results for both sorts back the overall
sentiment presented in much of the literature surrounding the low risk anomaly. Low
returns being much more prevalent in the high risk end of the portfolios is reflected in
both sorts, in line with beta level empirical findings of e.g. Frazzini and Pedersen (2014)
and Liu et al. (2018) as well as sorts on correlation and volatility between 1926 and 2015
by Asness et al. (2016).
Correlation in particular seems to have an asymmetric, primarily negative effect on (Fama
& French, 1993) three-factor alphas. High correlation deciles 8-10 all produce statistically
significant negative alphas on a 5% level, albeit averaging only around 10 bps per month.
The respective t-statistics range between -2.4 and -2.0. At the same time, as correlation
with the market increases, the stocks’ loading on the SMB factor increases monotonically,
having a positive effect on the returns in all deciles.
Volatility plays a similar role in return compensation, but with an even more robust
implications on the produced alphas. In addition to the negative effect witnessed when
sorting on correlation, volatility portfolios exhibit both statistically significant positive
alphas in the low end and negative alphas in the high end of the volatility spectrum.
Deciles 1-3 with the lowest ex-ante volatility estimates produce positive alphas between
10 and 20 bps with respective t-statistics between 3.2 and 2.6. At the same time, the effect
is inverse when it comes to high volatility stocks, as also found by e.g. Ang, Hodrick,
Xing, and Zhang (2006) and Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2009) with regards to high
idiosyncratic volatility as well as Bali et al. (2017) in arguing for lottery demand as the
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primary driver for the phenomenon. Volatility deciles also exhibit different behavior in
terms of loadings on SMB – deciles 1-3 all have a substantial negative relation to the
SMB factor entailing that the low volatility deciles consist primarily of larger firms.
The return patterns in the full sample are in line with my first hypothesis of correlation
having a negative impact on returns as it reflects the implicit leverage an investor can
take on. What is more, despite carrying lower variance, shorter tails and smaller beta
spread, the negative return impact of correlation is noticeable in the full sample without
normalizing the somewhat inverse effects of the negatively correlated volatility. More-
over, the negative trend in both beta determinants echoes similar findings when sorting
with beta, but more importantly confirms the key roles of both variables in seemingly
contributing to the low risk anomaly in the full sample.
Table 5 reports the monthly Fama and French (1993) three-factor alphas when sorting
independently on both correlation and volatility. The results are much more messy when
both variables are included with no clear, uniform trends in the sample. What is notable
however, is that in the intersection of the highest correlation portfolio and the two high-
est volatility portfolios, the alphas are particularly negative at around -60 and -70 bps,
while in the three lowest volatility portfolios the alphas are significantly closer to zero.
This relation however, does not manifest itself in the full sample for either of the beta
determinants. Contrary to the what the longer data period used by Asness et al. (2016)
exhibits, independent sorts with both of the beta determinants reveal little of the relative
importance between the two in being the underlying cause of the low risk anomaly.
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5.2 Margin Impact on Beta Constituents and SML Mockups
Results in table 6 strongly resemble the findings by (Jylhä, 2018) in a similar setting.
Aligning with expectations, the results show a flattening effect on the security market
line as binding margin constraints tighten. Margin level has a statistically significant
positive effect on the security market line intercept and an even stronger negative effect
on the slope.
For the main contributions of this study I set my sights on the initial margin regulation’s
impact on the returns on the beta determinants, correlation and volatility. In the full
sample correlation with the market exhibits somewhat puzzling results. The initial margin
requirement in month t − 1 has a significant negative impact on the intercept with a t-
statistic of -3.5 in the model (1) and -2.4 in model (2). The effect is contrarian to the
impact on beta compensation and close to on par in robustness.1Additionally, on the
contrary to the impact on beta, the contemporaneous market return holds statistically
significant explanatory power on the intercept whereas the security market line intercept
should not by definition be dependent on the market return. In table ?? model (2) the
market return coefficient holds a t-statistic of 10.0 and has a positive effect on correlation’s
return compensation. Constructing security market line mockups based on correlation
and volatility however changes the dynamics of the line ever so slightly. In the case of the
traditional security market line, the beta coefficient should capture the variation driven
by the market return, rendering the intercept term to capture other hypothetical return
drivers. This is not the case with either of my additional SML mockups as the other beta
component is not captured by the variable of interest.
With slope for correlation the story is also different from the full security market line.
Initial margin regulation in t−1 has a statistically significant positive impact on the slope
in table 7 panel A model (4). While the effect of margin requirements does not materialize
in model (3), the model in itself explains little of the variation in slope with an adjusted R2
of 0.3% compared to 5.4% in model (4). Therefore, in violation of my second hypothesis
in the full sample, not only do the higher margin requirements decrease the intercept of
the SML mockup, but in fact also steepen the slope. The change in the shape of the line
is not consistent with investors allocating more funds to higher correlation assets to cope
with leverage constraints as it is when examining beta.
Same analysis for volatility in table 7 panel B shows the for the most part non-significant
dependence on margin constraints. Models (1) and (2) for the intercept show no statistical
significance for initial margin. In model (3), without the inclusion of contemporaneous
market return, the initial margin requirement seems to have a negative effect on the slope
1Higher statistical significance in model (1) with t-statistics of -3.5 vs. 2.9. Lower in model (2) with
-2.4 and 2.9 respectively.
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of the SML mockup. However, this is also rendered insignificant when including market
return in model (4).
Neither of the two determinants alone show conclusive evidence of being the bearer of the
SML flattening force of leverage constraints. Further, neither is this empirical evidence
in favor of what Asness et al. (2016) argue to be the driver of Betting Against Correlation
profits.2Still, there are potential hindrances to the results I present in this section. As also
shown in table 2, the variation in betas between the high and low correlation quantiles is
lower than when sorting for volatility. A direct practical implication of the beta spread
is that the risk measured by beta is exacerbated more by changes in volatility than by
correlation with the market. Therefore, as correlation goes down, volatility goes up in
disproportionate amount, translating to potentially weaker returns to lower correlation
assets and higher returns to high correlation assets driven by volatility rather than the
properties of the correlation term.
2Section 5.4 takes a closer look on BAB, BAC and BAV performance during times of different margin
requirements.
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Table 6: Margin Regulation Impact on SML
This table presents the results of regressing the monthly security market line’s slope and intercept
on the lagged regulatory margin requirement. I estimate the portfolio betas following Jylhä
(2018) and regress the monthly excess returns on the monthly market return less the risk free
rate from the month t− 36 to month t− 1. Security Market Line intercepts and slopes for each
month are estimated by regressing monthly portfolio returns on portfolio betas. Monthly t-
statistics are reported in parentheses and 5% confidence level is highlighted in bold. The sample
period ranges from 1934 to 1974.
Dependent variable:
Intercept Slope
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant −0.012 −0.012 0.039 0.013
(−2.127)∗∗ (−2.074)∗∗ (3.781)∗∗∗ (2.183)∗∗
Margin 0.026 0.026 −0.055 −0.027
(2.917)∗∗∗ (2.876)∗∗∗ (−3.543)∗∗∗ (−2.940)∗∗∗
Market Return −0.006 1.024
(−0.183) (28.685)∗∗∗
R2 0.020 0.020 0.029 0.672
Adjusted R2 0.017 0.015 0.027 0.670
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 7: Margin Regulation Impact on Returns to Correlation and Volatility
This table presents the results of regressing the monthly security market line mockups’ slope
and intercept on the lagged regulatory margin requirement. I use daily return data to estimate
the volatility and correlation terms. For volatilities I apply a a one-year rolling window and
use a longer three-year window for correlations. Similarly, I use overlapping three day returns
to estimate correlation and one day log returns for volatilities. I run the volatility estimation
through rolling periods of 250 trading days and use 750 trading days for correlation to account
for slower movement. The SML mockups are built analogously to Jylhä (2018), but by treat-
ing correlation and volatility as the return drivers. Panel A reports the results from treating
correlation as the primary return drive and Panel B from applying the same logic to volatility.
Monthly t-statistics are reported in parentheses and 5% confidence level is highlighted in bold.
The sample period ranges from 1934 to 1974
Panel A: SML mockup based on correlation
Dependent variable:
Intercept Slope
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.065 0.039 −0.053 −0.079
(4.402)∗∗∗ (2.908)∗∗∗ (−1.842)∗ (−2.768)∗∗∗
Margin −0.079 −0.049 0.063 0.093
(−3.516)∗∗∗ (−2.389)∗∗ (1.444) (2.176)∗∗
Market Return 0.825 0.831
(9.960)∗∗∗ (4.752)∗∗∗
R2 0.030 0.223 0.005 0.058
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.219 0.003 0.054
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Panel B: SML mockup based on volatility
Dependent variable:
Intercept Slope
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.007 −0.007 0.015 0.003
(0.948) (−1.170) (2.882)∗∗∗ (0.743)
Margin −0.005 0.012 −0.018 −0.005
(−0.441) (1.246) (−2.337)∗∗ (−0.712)
Market Return 0.457 0.366
(11.707)∗∗∗ (14.153)∗∗∗
Observations 403 403 403 403
R2 0.0005 0.256 0.013 0.343
Adjusted R2 -0.002 0.252 0.011 0.339
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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5.3 Margin Impact on Sorted Portfolios
The results of my precedent analysis merely exhibit either weak or contradictory findings
to much of my second hypothesis. However, the analysis does not fully take into account
the jointly determined nature of beta; different combinations of volatility and correlation
can and do produce betas of similar levels. As shown in section 5.1, residual variance
seems to play a disproportionate role in comparison to what is implied by the mean
variance framework. Therefore, treating correlation and volatility as independent return
drivers may entail substantial issues with noise caused by the other determinant. To
mitigate this concern, I repeat the precedent analysis while also controlling for volatility
(correlation) in estimating the effect of margin requirements correlation (volatility). The
methodology allows one to isolate the outcome of increasing beta through either one of the
components keeping the other one close to constant. Additionally, the approach allows
for a more analogous setting to the Betting Against Correlation factor construction in
attempting to standardize the effects of volatility, albeit still value weighting the stocks
as opposed to the rank weights used in Asness et al. (2016). The consequent results
from regressing the intercept and slope on the margin requirement across portfolios are
presented in table 8.
As stated in my hypothesis 2.2, conditioning on volatility produces a flatter SML mockup
for correlation even if this may not manifest itself in the full sample due to noise or
any similar weakening of the pure measure by changes in volatility. Further analysis
on portfolio level provides more encouraging results in favor of this proposition: the
negative return relation of volatility seems to trump the more delicate return driver in
correlation. Initial margin requirement has a monotonically decreasing effect on the slope
of my security market line mockup as volatility decreases. The increasing initial margin
requirement has a statistically significant negative effect on my correlation security market
line mockup in three out of the five volatility portfolios with t-statistics between -2.4 and
-3.1. What is more, in the lowest volatility portfolio the initial margin requirement has
a statistically positive impact on the intercept on a 5% level with a t-statistic of 2.3.
Contrary to the full sample the second hypothesis still holds partially in flattening the
SML mockup when correlation is treated separately from volatility. The flattening impact
however does not span the full sample.
The high volatility portfolio however behaves very differently with the margin level having
a negative impact on the intercept. While unintuitive in some respects, this may be
due to the smaller correlation spread in the high volatility portfolio. Alternatively, this
may exhibit a lottery-demand based explanation. Positively skewed stocks tend to be
correlated with high ex-ante volatility and in demand for such stocks’ correlation with
the market plays an inverse role in that increased correlation with the market should
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(a) By Correlation Quantile (b) By Volatility Quantile
Figure 2: Beta Composition Across Volatility and Correlation Quantiles
not have anything to do with lottery-like payoffs but still increases the total risk of the
stocks.
Conditioned on correlation the impact of initial margin requirement on returns to volatil-
ity is rendered insignificant across all quantiles. This result is also in favor of my second
hypothesis in that (residual) volatility does not seem to play much of a role in compen-
sating for tighter leverage constraints. While the effect is not completely unequivocal
when sorting on volatility, the opposite is true for sorting with correlation: the impact
of t − 1 initial margin requirement on the security market line mockup for volatility is
blatantly ambiguous or non-existent.
Figure 2 demonstrates the beta decomposition across the correlation and volatility quan-
tiles. Sorting on volatility produces a wider beta spread in spite of the declining level of
correlation as volatility increases. This together with table 2 demonstrates the somewhat
divided nature of beta in this decomposition. The negative correlation between the two
determinants is clearly visible in both graphs but seems to have a stronger impact on the
total beta when sorting on correlation. The level of correlation with the market is partic-
ularly low in the highest volatility portfolio: as volatility increases the level of correlation
with the market becomes less and less important in determining a stock’s beta risk and
therefore these slight changes in systematic risk warrant lesser attention from investors
seeking to increase their market risk exposure.
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Table 8: Margin Impact on Portfolios Sorted on Volatility and Correlation
This table presents the results of regressing the monthly security market line mockups’ slope
and intercept on the lagged regulatory margin requirement. Intercept and slope are constructed
within each correlation and volatility quantile. Correlation with the market is treated as the
positive return driver when sorting for volatility and vice versa. The correlation and volatility
quantiles are rebalanced in the beginning of each calendar month based on the estimates at
the end of month t − 1. Panel A presents the regression results for volatility sorted portfolios
when treating market correlation as the return driver. Panel B presents the results when sorting
for correlation and treating volatility as the return driver. Monthly t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. The sample period ranges from 1934 to 1974.
Panel A: Sort on Volatility
Intercept Slope
Constant Margin Constant Margin
Low −0.030 0.046 0.122 −0.166
(−2.251)∗∗ (2.301)∗∗ (3.468)∗∗∗ (−3.120)∗∗∗
2 −0.013 0.026 0.110 −0.156
(−0.853) (1.126) (2.792)∗∗ (−2.619)∗∗
3 −0.008 0.017 0.127 −0.173
(−0.466) (0.641) (2.610)∗∗ (−2.359)∗∗
4 0.024 −0.020 0.072 −0.114
(1.366) (−0.737) (1.397) (−1.480)
High 0.083 −0.097 −0.049 0.049
(4.142)∗∗∗ (−3.206)∗∗∗ (−0.858) (0.574)
Panel B: Sort on Correlation
Intercept Slope
Constant Margin Constant Margin
Low 0.001 0.003 0.017 −0.021
(0.107) (0.204) (2.243)∗∗ (−1.802)∗
2 0.000 0.007 0.017 −0.024
(0.011) (0.375) (1.602) (−1.449)
3 0.023 −0.028 0.007 −0.007
(1.491) (1.199) (0.740) (−0.482)
4 0.037 −0.049 −0.002 0.007
(2.055)∗∗ (−1.810)∗ (−0.254) (0.529)
High 0.033 −0.040 −0.002 0.005
(1.756)∗ (−1.417) (−0.235) (0.348)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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5.4 BAB, BAC and BAV Performance and Leverage Constraints
Table 9 reports the results on regressing the BAB factor return on Fama and French
(1993) common risk factors and the change in initial margin requirement. Negative
change in margin requirement characterizes the observed SML movement towards its
CAPM prediction when market-wide margin constraints are relaxed. This measure is
particularly interesting as it indicates the magnitude of change towards a known reference
model as opposed to varying levels of flatter security market line estimates. During the
period I classify changes in margin level into three categories: most negative, neutral and
most positive with one third of all the changes in each.
The lagged changes in initial margin requirement reflect the perceived changes investors
have to deal with in allocating their funds, in that large changes, either positive or
negative should warrant for more dramatic moves in the following period. Relaxing the
margin requirement substantially in this context should therefore restate the security
market line more towards its CAPM prediction and release the price pressure on high
beta assets. The declining demand in the following period should materialize in the
market in two ways: lower returns to high beta assets and higher returns to low beta
assets as the disproportionately low demand somewhat neutralizes. I use and indicator
for changing margin levels in the simple regressions in lieu of margin level due to the
disproportionately small variation in a monthly setting. Change in the strictness of the
constraints is also a relevant in assessing the impact of a portfolio readjustment process
attributed to changing leverage constraints.
The Betting Against Beta factor performance is in line with previous research (by e.g.
Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) and Liu et al. (2018) given pure BAB performance) and
the flattening of the security market line in response to tighter leverage constraints.
The BAB factor delivers a 0.5% monthly alpha in both the pure CAPM and an FF3
model specifications with respective t-statistics of 3.7 and 4.2. Large relaxing changes
in the margin requirement increase the returns to the BAB factor in both models (3)
and (4). The margin change indicator generates positive t-statistics of 2.9 and 2.3 in the
two models rendering simple CAPM alpha insignificant on a 5-% level. The Fama and
French (1993) three-factor alpha however still persists, indicating that there may be more
variables at play in producing the robust BAB risk-adjusted returns to the BAB factor
as documented in models (1) and (2).
The BAC factor exhibits similar behavior as documented by Asness et al. (2016) in pro-
ducing positive monthly alphas of around 20 bps in models (1) and (2) with respective
t-statistics of 2.7 and 2.9. As expected, the first two models capture the strong perfor-
mance of BAC across the full period against standard CAPM and Fama and French (1993)
models. My third proposition states that the impact of exogenous margin constraints on
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BAB materializes primarily through the correlation component, as investors adjust their
portfolios mainly through changing portfolio allocations to systematic risk. In testing the
behavior, similarly to my previous regressions on the BAB factor, I include the negative
margin change variable in measuring the impact of easing up margin regulation. Models
(3) and (4) in table 10 show varying degrees of margin impact. In model (3), regressing
the BAC return only on the contemporaneous market return, relaxing the market-wide
margin requirement does not exhibit statistically significant explanatory power over the
BAC return. However, including the full Fama and French (1993) factors shows an impact
with on par significance when comparing to regressing the full BAB factor on the same
explanatory variables. In model (4) the BAC factor only loads on SMB and negative
margin change on statistically significant levels. The result is in line with proposition 3
and at the same time driven by one of the basic properties of BAC, firm size. Larger
firms tend to be more correlated with the market, as they also represent a more sizable
chunk of the market index as a whole. An intuitive direct implication of model (4) is that
BAC represents a bet against large firms that attract funds in the presence of margin
constraints.
As far as profitability goes, the BAV factor outperforms BAC by delivering monthly
alphas of around 40 bps as opposed to 20 bps with BAC. Models (1) and (2) without the
change in margin constraints show robust negative loading on the market return as well
as SMB and HML factors. Peculiarly, in models (3) and (4) the behavior with regards
to change in leverage conditions is opposite to BAC. In model (3), including only the
market excess return, relaxing the prevalent margin requirement has a positive effect of
similar magnitude as with BAB. Including the Fama and French (1993) risk factors in
turn renders the effect statistically insignificant. The results with BAV in model (3)
are consequently somewhat puzzling in the light of my findings in section 5.3, as the
level of margin requirements does not seem to play a role in determining returns to
volatility.
This behavior in the results seems to come down to model selection. The impact of
changes in initial margin requirement is of nearly the same statistical robustness both in
model (3) between BAB and BAV as well as in model (4) between BAB and BAC. Ap-
plying the methodology to BAB produces similar results for both of the models, implying
that the negative margin change variable has indeed a statistically significant effect on
the BAB return, even reducing the model (3) alpha’s t-statistic down from 3.7 to 1.8.
However, taking a closer look with BAC and BAV, a linear combination of which approx-
imates BAB to a high degree, we can see that the effects are highly dependent on the
applied model. This dependency on the model seems like a minor pain point – the varia-
tion shifts notably between the CAPM and Fama and French (1993) three factor model
when including the additional SMB and HML factors. Bear in mind that the correlation
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term used in BAC is positively correlated with market return. It is then evident in model
(3) that market return should not by definition have a positive impact on the BAC factor
return. Including other common risk factors changes this picture drastically, reducing
the t-statistic on market return down to -0.2. With BAV the change is not as dramatic,
but still rather noticeable. The negative impact of market return is clearly reduced and
attributed more to SMB and HML factors. Including the two also renders the effect of
margin requirement changes insignificant. The closer look at expected factor loadings
then provides some encouraging support in favor of the effects realizing through BAC
rather than BAV. To an extent, these results then echo the hypothesis by Asness et al.
(2016) in higher correlation being a proxy for stocks attractive for adjusting for contraints
to leverage and BAC being a relevant vehicle for profiting from these properties.
Table 9: BAB Factor Performance with Margin Constraints
This table reports the performance of the BAB factor when regressed on FF3 risk-factors and
negative initial margin change. I construct BAB, BAC and BAV following the logic presented by
Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) and Asness et al. (2016). All factors are rank-weighed with, in the
case of BAB, the factor going long in low and short in high beta assets, the highest beta receives
the highest rank in the short leg and vice versa for lowest beta in the long portfolio. Monthly
alphas are in relation to total price (percentage / 100). T-stats for each of the coefficients are
in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
BAB Factor Return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Alpha 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.004
(3.716)∗∗∗ (4.167)∗∗∗ (1.798)∗ (2.483)∗∗
Market Return −0.310 −0.189 −0.316 −0.197
(−10.768)∗∗∗ (−6.111)∗∗∗ (−11.018)∗∗∗ (−6.354)∗∗∗
SMB −0.340 −0.324
(−6.772)∗∗∗ (−6.433)∗∗∗
HML −0.144 −0.151
(−3.033)∗∗∗ (−3.180)∗∗∗
Neg. Margin chg 0.009 0.007
(2.929)∗∗∗ (2.385)∗∗
R2 0.203 0.302 0.218 0.311
Adjusted R2 0.202 0.298 0.215 0.305
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 10: BAC and BAV Factors Performance with Margin Constraints
This table reports the performance of BAC (Panel A) and BAV (Panel B) factors when regressed
on FF3 risk-factors and negative initial margin change. I construct BAC and BAV following the
logic presented by Asness et al. (2016). The factors are rank-weighed with e.g. in the case of
BAC, the factor going long in low and short in high correlation assets, the highest beta receives
the highest rank in the short leg and vice versa for lowest correlation in the long portfolio.
Monthly alphas are in relation to total price (percentage / 100). T-statistics for each of the
coefficients are in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
Factor Return
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: BAC
Alpha 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001
(2.706)∗∗∗ (2.918)∗∗∗ (1.730)∗ (1.423)
Market Return 0.081 0.001 0.080 −0.004
(4.172)∗∗∗ (0.037) (4.089)∗∗∗ (−0.200)
SMB 0.264 0.274
(7.781)∗∗∗ (8.055)∗∗∗
HML 0.029 0.025
(0.903) (0.774)
Neg. Margin chg 0.003 0.004
(1.249) (2.314)∗∗
Panel B: BAV
Alpha 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.003
(2.657)∗∗∗ (3.483)∗∗∗ (1.222) (2.512)∗∗
Market Return −0.345 −0.138 −0.349 −0.141
(−11.816)∗∗∗ (−5.117)∗∗∗ (−11.980)∗∗∗ (−5.200)∗∗∗
SMB −0.628 −0.622
(−14.398)∗∗∗ (−14.133)∗∗∗
HML −0.168 −0.171
(−4.062)∗∗∗ (−4.117)∗∗∗
Neg. Margin chg 0.007 0.003
(2.204)∗∗ (1.070)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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6 Conclusion
Leverage constraints provide an economically intuitive explanation for the low risk anomaly
– investors that cannot use leverage to sufficiently adjust their risk to suit their appetite
have to resort to riskier securities. Yet, despite recent efforts in the existing literature by
e.g. Jylhä (2018), it seems that there may still be other explanations at play. With data
from the US stock market ranging between 1934 and 1974, I take a more granular look on
the low risk anomaly and the changing shape of the security market line in dividing beta
into its systematic (correlation with the market) and behavioral (volatility) parts.
I find that conditioned on volatility, the return compensation to market correlation is
negatively affected by tighter margin requirements, as predicted by previous findings
by e.g. Jylhä (2018), Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) and Asness et al. (2016). In line
with previous research I propose that this negative relationship represents the ’implicit,
non-financial leverage’ that investors are forced to take when constrained for financial
leverage. I also show empirically that this relation only holds when considering the part
of beta that represents systematic risk, i.e. correlation with the market, as opposed
to seeking to increase portfolio risk from higher volatility in relation to the market.
While volatility and behavioral factors may still manifest themselves in producing at
least parts of the anomaly, as proposed by e.g. Stambaugh and Yuan (2017) and Bali
et al. (2017), there seems to be little overlap with my findings on the effect of tighter
leverage constraints.
Further, I tie my results to the papers by Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) and Asness et
al. (2016) in applying the logic in the context of Betting Against Beta, Betting Against
Correlation and Betting Against Variance. My findings provide additional support for
the BAC factor profit being largely related to the lagged changes in system-wide margin
requirements. However, I cannot fully rule out leverage constraints having an impact also
on the variance portion of BAB.
The alternative decomposition of beta into correlation and volatility provides intriguing
possibilities for further research. One of the clear avenues has to do with expanding
the data set – I use the same data on the FED mandated margin requirements in the
U.S. as Jylhä (2018). Even though this choice of data provides a market-wide take on
the pure exogenous changes in margin requirements, it would be valuable to repeat the
analysis during a longer time period to capture the vast changes in stock ownership and
information availability in the stock market. Secondly, using alternative indicators, such
as the margin debt held by NYSE broker dealers applied by Asness et al. (2016), would
help shed light on return variability with more continuous changes and within shorter
time frames. Finally, decomposing beta and the security market line into systematic and
37
behavioral risk may help address to relative importance of the systematic and behavioral
factors at play bridging the gap between the two schools of thought.
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